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Synonyms
Malicious-code-free Operating System; Secure Bio-
metric Token Operating System
Definition
Operating System with a robust design, as not to allow
the execution of malicious code. Access to internal data
and procedures are never allowed without the proper
authorization. In its more strict implementations, this
Operating System will have attack detection mechan-
isms. If the attack is of a certain level, the Operating
System may even delete all its code and/or data.
Introduction
The handling of sensible data in Information Systems
is currently very usual. Which data is to be considered
sensible is up to the application, but at least we can
consider those such as personal data, financial data as
well as access control data. Actors dealing with such
Information System (clients/citizens, service providers,
integrators, etc.) have to be aware of the security level
achieved within the system.
Although this is a very important issue in any system,
when biometric information is handled it becomes a
critical point. Reason for this is that biometric informa-
tion is permanently valid, as it is expected to be kept the
same during the whole life of a person. While a private
key can be changed as desired and even cancelled, a user
cannot change his fingerprint (unless changing finger) or
even cancel it. If cancelling biometric raw data, the user
will be limited, in case of fingerprints, to 10 successful
attacks during his/her whole life. These kind of consid-
erations has already been published even back to 1998, as
it can be read in [1].
Therefore, biometric systems have to be kept as
secure as possible. There are several Potential Vulnera-
ble Points (PVPs) in any Biometric System, as it can be
seen in Fig. 1. All those 9 PVPs have to be considered
when designing a biometric solution. A good introduc-
tion to threats in a Biometric System can be found in
[2, 3], and in BEM [4].
 PVP 1 has to deal with user attitudes, as well as
capture device front end. Regarding user attitude,
an authorised user can provide his own biometric-
sample to an impostor unknowingly, unwillingly,
or even willingly. From thecapture device front-end
point of view, such device may not be able to:
– Detect a nonlive sample
– Detect the quality of the input sample, being able
to discard those under a determined threshold
– Protect the quality threshold againstmanipulation
– Detect degradation of its own degradation
– Resist environmental factors
– Eliminate residual information from previous
captures
– Detect and discard sample injection
– Deny successive and fast sample presentation
 PVP 2 is directly related to the threat group 3 of
BEM. It is basically focused on the capture device
back-end, as well as the front-end of the Biometric
Algorithm. Captured sample could be intercepted
and/or reinjected, to provide a reply-attack. Major
problem relies on the potential lost of the user’s
biometric identity. Also, another threat is a ▶ hill-
climbing attack by injecting successive biometric
samples.
 PVPs 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 could be treated as in any
other IT system (Trojans, Viruses, communications
interception, data injection, hill climbing attacks,
etc.). So the same kind of study shall be done.
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It is in this kind of PVPs where a Tamper-proof
Operating System can be of help. It is important to
note that sensibility related to biometric related
information covers not only the sample data, fea-
ture vectors, and templates, but also thresholds,
access logs, and algorithms.
 PVP 5, being also a typical point of study in any IT
system, has here more importance depending on the
information that could be given by the system after
the matching. If matching result is not given just by
an OK / ERROR message, but also carries informa-
tion about the level of matching acquired, this could
be used by an attacker to build an artificial sample,
by hill-climbing techniques. For this PVP also, the
Tamper-proof O.S. can play an important role.
Biometric Devices
Regarding Biometrics, a Tamper-proof Operating Sys-
tem is intended to be running in some (or any) ele-
ments which are part of the Biometric System. The idea
of this kind of Operating Systems is not new, as they
are already implemented in other areas, such as
▶ smart cards for financial services. This kind of
electronic devices are designed under a basic security
rule: ‘‘Not only the device has to work under its con-
strained conditions of user, but also has to stop work-
ing outside those conditions’’. In few words, this means
that, for example, if the smart card is expected to work
with a supply voltage from 4.5 to 5.5 volts, it does not
have to work outside the range (e.g., if supply voltage is
4.4 or 5.6, not even a response has to be obtained from
the card). Related to the Operating System inside the
card, this covers things like not allowing the execution
of any undefined/undocumented command, or not
being able to install new functions that can behave as
Trojan Horses or Viruses.
With this example, the reader can think that this
kind of products does not really exist, because several
papers have been published related to security problems
with smartcards (e.g., [5] and some general audience
press). It has to be stated that not all times that an
integrated circuit identification card is referred, it is
really a smartcard (i.e., a microprocessor-based identi-
fication card with a tamper-proof O.S.). Also, some
real smartcards have not been properly issued, leaving
some critical data files unprotected, or not using the
security mechanisms provided. Rules to be followed to
properly use a smartcard can be found in [6].
This same kind of rules can be applied to all kind of
biometric devices. Obviously, depending on the system
architecture, biometric devices can be of very different
kinds. Figure 2 shows two possible architectures of a
biometric authentication system, which are usually
known as (a) match-off-card (also known as match-off-
token), and (b) match-on-card (or match-on-token).
Apart from these two, many other schemes can be
designed.
In a match-off-card system (e.g., [7]), we can con-
sider a simplification of the system as composed of
three devices: the capture device, the token or card
where the user’s template is stored, and the rest of the
system, which will be named as ‘‘Biometric System’’.
Tamper-proof Operating System. Figure 1 Potential vulnerable points in a Biometric System where Enrolment is
considered secured).
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Major difference with the match-on-card system (e.g.,
[8]) is that here the token only stores the user’s tem-
plate, while in the match-on-card version it also per-
forms some biometric-related computations.
In any case, any of those devices should be designed
following the rules given below regarding a Tamper-
proof O.S. Being this viable if those devices are devel-
oped as embedded systems, major problems can arise
when one of those devices (typically the Biometric
System) is running on a general purpose computer,
where little or no control is possible for installed appli-
cations and data exchange.
Requirements for a Tamper-Proof O.S.
Once focused, the environment where a Tamper-
proof O.S. has to be found in Biometric Devices, it is
time to start its design. A good starting point will be
following all previous works dealing with smart cards.
The reason for that is to transfer the know–how of near
30 years of secure identification tokens given by the
smart card industry [9]. This same ideas can be extra-
polated to other biometric devices, not only personal
tokens.
First thing to consider when designing a Tamper-
proof O.S. is the different life phases that the biometric
device will have. All devices, specially those related to
personal authentication, should go through different
life stages, from manufacturing to its use by the end
users. As information handled by them is really sensi-
ble, extra protection should be taken to avoid robbery,
emulation, or fraudulent access to the device or its
information. Therefore, security mechanisms will be
forced in each life stage. Those mechanisms are mainly
based on Transport Keys, which protect the access to
using the device in each change of life phase. Life
phases defined are:
 Manufacturing: where the device is assembled. The
microcontroller within the device should be pro-
tected by a Transport Key, before delivered to the
next stage. The way to compute that Transport Key
for each microcontroller, will be sent to the com-
pany responsible of the next phase by a separate
and secured way.
 Personalization: In this phase, each device is differ-
entiated from all others by storing some unique
data related to the final application, user, and access
conditions. Some times this phase is split in several
subphases, specially when the device has to be
Tamper-proof Operating System. Figure 2 Some architectures of biometric authentication systems, splitting tasks in
several devices.
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personalized for the application (prepersonaliza-
tion) and then for the final user (personalization),
as it may happen with identification tokens. In this
phase, also Data Structure regarding the applica-
tions may be created, as well as the full security
architecture.
 Usage: The end user is ready to use the device.
 Discontinuation: Due to ageing, limited time use,
accidents, or attack detection, the devicemay be out
of use. This can be temporary (for example, when
keys are blocked), or permanent (no re-activation is
allowed). It has to be guaranteed that once discon-
tinued, such device shall not be able to be used.
Entering in details regarding the requirements for a
tamper-proof operating system, we can state the fol-
lowing general rules:
 Mutual Authentication mechanisms have to be
used before exchanging any kind of biometric
information. In any communication, both parts
have to be sure that the other party is a reliable one.
 To avoid▶ replay attacks, some time-stamping-like
mechanisms have to be used (e.g., generation of
session keys to sign/cipher eachmessage exchanged).
 Only the manufactured designed commands can
be executed. No possibility of downloading new
commands has to be allowed. Therefore, flash rep-
rogramming and device updating are strongly
discouraged.
 Before executing anything in the biometric device,
full integrity check (both cryptographic and
semantic) of the command and its data has to be
performed. Some attacks would try to exploit
undefined cases in the semantics of a command
exchanged.
 All sensible data (sample data, feature vectors,
templates, and thresholds) has to be transmitted
ciphered.
 If there is a command related to changing para-
meters, it has to be sent with all security mechan-
isms allowed, as the system can be even more
vulnerable to attacks related to changing those
parameters (e.g., quality or verification thresholds).
 Feedback information from the device to the exter-
nal world has to be as short as possible to avoid hill-
climbing attacks. For example, a device performing
comparisons in an authentication system has to
provide only a YES/NO answer, but not giving
information on the matching score obtained.
 Attack detection mechanisms have to be consid-
ered. If an attack is detected, then the device has to
stop working, and a reinitialization has to be made.
If the detected attack is consider extremely serious,
the device may consider deleting not only all tem-
poral data, but also its permanent data or even it
programming code.
 Successive failed attempts to satisfy any security
condition has to be considered as an attack, and
therefore, the device has to be blocked, as it hap-
pens with a PIN code in a smartcard.
 No direct access to hardware resources (e.g., mem-
ory addresses, communication ports, etc) can be
allowed. Most virus and Trojan horses benefit for
not following this rule.
 As soon as data is no longer needed by the
Operating System, it has to be erased as to prevent
latent data to be acquired in a successful attack.
Most of these requirements canbe satisfiedbydefining
a security architecture basedon cryptographic algorithms.
Several implementations can be followed. If the developer
is not familiar with these mechanisms, it is suggested
to follow the secret codes/secret keys architecture of a
smartcard, and the Secure Messaging mechanism [6, 9].
These can be directly applied to personal Tokens, and
upgraded to other kind of biometric devices.
Example of an O.S. Instruction Set
When implementing a Tamper-proof O.S. several
design decisions have to be made: Frame formats,
time-outs, number of retries, etc. All these issues
depend on the communication strategy followed by
the whole biometric system. Therefore, no general
rule can be given to the designed.
Regarding the instruction set, a minimal list of
functions can be considered, depending on the device
where the O.S. is to be included. This is also dependent
on the platform chosen. As an example, the instruction
set for a limited-resources platforms is given. This
instruction set has been proposed to ISO/IEC JTC1/
SC37 to be considered as a lighter version of BioAPI,
the standardized Application Program Interface for
biometric applications. This lighter version is expected
to be called BioAPI Lite.
Commands needed by a limited biometric device,
depends on the functionality of such device. Obviously
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is not the same a capture device, than a personal token.
But in general terms these commands can be classified
in four major groups: Module Management, Template
Management, Biometric Enrolment, and Biometric
Process.
Management Commands relate to manage the
overall module behavior. Four commands can be con-
sidered in this group:
 Initialize: Tells the module to initialize itself, open-
ing the offered services and initialize all security for
ciphered data exchange. This command is to be
called any time a session is started (power on,
session change, etc). Without being called, the rest
of the commands shall not work.
 Close: Tells the module to shutdown.
 Get Properties: Provides information on capabil-
ities, configuration, and state.
 Update Parameters: Updates parameters in mod-
ule. One of such parameters can be the comparison
threshold. For that reason, this function is recom-
mended to be used with all security mechanisms
available.
Template Management Commands refer to those
functions needed to store and retrieve templates from
the module. These functions will be supported by
those modules that are able to store users’ templates.
These set of commands are expected to be used by
personal tokens or small databases. The functions
defined are:
 Store Template: Stores the input template in the
internal biometric module database.
 Retrieve Template: Obtain the referenced template
from the biometric module.
The next group is the Biometric Enrolment Com-
mands. This group of functions will be considered in
systems where enrolment is to be made internally. Due
to the different process of enrolment, even for a single
biometric modality (e.g., different number of samples
needed), in limited devices a multi step procedure
is suggested. First, user will call functions related to
obtain samples for the enrolment and then a call to
the Enrol function will have to be done. Commands
defined are:
 Capture for Enrol: Performs a biometric capture
(using onboard sensor), keeping the information in
module for later enrolment process. The number
this function is called depends on the number of
samples the module needs to perform enrolment.
As this operation involves user interaction, biomet-
ric module manufacturer shall consider time-out
values to cancel operation, reporting that situation
in the Status code returned.
 Acquire for Enrol: Receives a biometric sample
to keep the information in module for later enro-
lment process. The number this function is called
depends on the number of samples the module
needs to perform enrolment. Depending on mod-
ule capabilities, input data can be a raw sample,
a preprocessed one, or its corresponding feature
vector.
 Enrol: Performs an enrolment to create a template
and stores the template in module. To execute this
function, either Capture for Enrol or Acquire for
Enrol functions has to be called in advance. Enrol
with process with the samples temporally stored
in the module. The return value is the number of
template internally assigned.
 Erase Enrolments: Erases all enrolment templates
or the indicated (by number) template.
Finally, the fourth group is dedicated to all those
commands that are dealing with biometric functions.
It covers the capture process, feature extraction, and
comparison. Even with comparison, it handles com-
parisons with internal templates, or templates coming
from the external world.
 Capture: Performs a biometric capture (using
on-board sensor), returning biometric sample.
 Process: Processes biometric sample to create com-
parable recognition data (feature vector). Depend-
ing on module capabilities, the input sample can
be a raw sample or a preprocessed one.
 Capture and Process: Performs a biometric capture
(using on-board sensor), returning its feature
vector.
 Compare External: Compares a feature vector with
the template sent by the external world.
 Process and Compare External: Processes a biomet-
ric sample and compares it with the template sent
by the external world.
 Capture and Compare External: Perform a biomet-
ric capture (using on-board sensor), process the
biometric sample, and compares it with the tem-
plate sent by the external world.
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 Compare Internal: Compares a feature vector with
templates stored in the module. If the input
parameter is 0xFF, comparison will be done with
all templates stored. In other case, comparison is
done only with the template whose internal num-
ber is given at the input parameter.
 Process and Compare Internal: Processes a biomet-
ric sample and compares it with templates stored in
the module. If the input parameter is 0xFF, com-
parison will be done with all templates stored. In
other case, comparison is done only with the tem-
plate whose internal number is given at the input
parameter.
 Capture and Compare Internal: Perform a biomet-
ric capture (using on-board sensor), process the
biometric sample, and compares it with templates
stored in the module. If the input parameter is
0xFF, comparison will be done with all templates
stored. In other case, comparison is done only with
the template whose internal number is given at the
input parameter.
Some of these instructions involve user interaction.
Therefore, manufacturer shall consider time-out
values to cancel operation if it is exceeded, reporting
that situation within the protocol used.
Applicability of Tamper-Proof O.S.
As mentioned above, this kind of Operating System
is desirable to be included in all devices related to
Biometric Identification, but unfortunately this is not
always possible. As in many applications a general
purpose computer is used, general purpose Operating
Systems are used (such as Windows, Linux, etc.).
Developing those O.S. in a Tamper-proof way, without
restricting usability and generality is nearly impossible.
Therefore, Tamper-proof Operating Systems are meant
for those embedded systems, sensors and personal
tokens, dealing with personal identification.
Using this kind of Tamper-proof O.S. in these
devices, restrict the number of security holes to the
minimum within the device, and to be concentrated
only in those general purpose systems used. As some
tasks will be performed in such secured devices, secu-
rity leaks will be avoided. For example, if a biometric
system uses personal tamper-proof tokens with match-
on-card capability, the user’s template will never be
exposed, and possibility of hill-climbing or replay
attacks will be cancelled. Thus, all comparison and
decision blocks will be secured, restricting the potential
security problems to the relevant previous modules.
Summary
Due to the sensibility of biometric data, security in
biometric devices has to be considered. One of the
ways to protect privacy is to include a Tamper-proof
operating system. This O.S. would not allow direct
access to hardware resources of the device, neither
to temporary nor permanent data. This O.S. has also
to control the different life stages of the device. A set of
requirements have been defined that have to be con-
sidered when developing such Tamper-proof O.S.
Finally an example of the commands to be covered
by some devices have been given. Including this kind
of O.S. in all biometric devices will improve the secu-
rity of the whole system. Unfortunately, when some
parts of the biometric system has to be implemented in
a general purpose computer with an open Operating
System, applying these rules is not easy.
Related Entries
▶Biometric Security Threat
▶Biometric Template Security
▶Biometric Token
▶Biometric Vulnerabilities
▶Match-off-Card
▶Match-on-Card
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